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Who should protect the public against bad
doctors?
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, and Bruce W. Richman, MA,
Houston, TexOut, you impostors!
Quack salving, cheating mountebanks! your skill
Is to make sound men sick, and sick men kill.
Philip Massinger and Thomas Dekker (1620; Virgin-
Martyr, act IV, sc. 1)
Not long ago, the board of medical examiners in
one of our largest states revoked the medical license of
a surgeon and fined him $845,000 for habitually poor
practice. The surgeon began his career by failing his
specialty certification exams three times, but eventually
became the highest paid physician in the state’s work-
ers’ compensation program, earning $3.3 million from
the agency in 2002. He lived ostentatiously in a multi-
million dollar home and owned a jet plane.
He first came to the notice of the state board in
1985, when he was arrested after 30 grams of cocaine
were found in his car during a traffic stop. He was
convicted and placed on probation by the medical
board for “intemperate use of drugs.” In 1995, admin-
istrative law judges recommended that his license be
revoked, but the board of medical examiners again
voted for probation.
During these two decades, the surgeon was charged
in more than 60 malpractice suits, had a peer review
board find that he performed 29 unnecessary opera-
tions—two of which resulted in the deaths of patients—
and was the subject of 125 complaints filed with the
state board. Described as charming, with an excellent
bedside manner, he routinely prescribed patients large
doses of narcotics and regularly convinced them to let
him re-operate, “often the same procedure in the same
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It took more than 20 years of chronic and danger-
ous malpractice and many cries for help from his pa-
tients and other doctors before this physician was
stopped. Who was ethically responsible for protecting
the public from him?
A. The state medical board
B. Hospital-based peer review
C. The malpractice tort system
D. Specialty certification boards
E. His specialty’s professional society
Is the case we have described so rare and isolated that
only its oddity is worth notice, perhaps just a mention in
some believe-it-or-not type paperback on sale at supermar-
ket checkout aisles? Similar cases of chronic, poor, and
dangerous practice, proceeding virtually without impedi-
ment, have been the subjects of exposes in national news
magazines and network television features.
Virtually all measurable human activity, particularly
medical practice, can be displayed in Gaussian distribution
on a bell-shaped curve. In scientific theory, variations of
over two standard deviations from the mean determine
significance, confirming a performance level that is either
better or worse than that of the composite group. We
recognize and reward those at the higher end of the pro-
fession by referring the most difficult cases to them, seeking
their opinions, electing them to prestigious medical societ-
ies, and lining their office walls with awards. If some doctors
are the best, there will inevitably be some who are among
the worst, people who never mastered the craft, accumu-
lated the knowledge, or accepted the enormous ethical
responsibilities that properly go with the job.
According to the National Practitioner Data Bank,2
only 5% of physicians are responsible for 33% of all the
malpractice awards paid in the United States. Physicians
who sustain more malpractice awards were also the subjects
of more adverse administrative actions by hospitals and
professional organizations than were doctors with fewer
payable liability verdicts and settlements,2 indicating a con-
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medical and legal professions. Weycker analyzed the mal-
practice history of 8,700 physicians in Michigan and found
that a past history of patient lawsuits strongly predicted
future malpractice suits,3 which is precisely why an individ-
ual’s malpractice insurance premiums are raised as lawsuits
accumulate. These kinds of data confirm that habitually bad
physicians are abroad in the land, routinely practicing un-
sound medicine on vulnerable and unsuspecting patients.
Our rogue surgeon is not sui generis.
Dr Thomas Percival (1740 to 1804), one of the fathers
of modern medical ethics, argued that an essential compo-
nent of the development of medicine as a profession should
be the physician’s acceptance of the healer’s training and
role as a social contract. Percival advocated removal from
the profession of those who are unwilling or unable to work
in a fiduciary capacity: “Let both the Physician and Surgeon
never forget that their professions are public trusts, prop-
erly rendered lucrative whilst they fulfill them, but which
they are bound by honour and probity to relinquish as soon
as they find themselves unequal to their adequate and
faithful execution.”4
The implication for self-regulation within the profes-
sion is clear: to maintain the profession as a public trust,
physicians have an obligation to monitor the quality of
colleagues’ performance. The medical profession is a moral
community with an ethical obligation to keep its members
from harming the larger society within which it functions.
With the advent of medical licensure in the 19th cen-
tury, the medical profession accepted an explicit social
contract which codified its ancient implicit bond.5 In ex-
change for a monopoly over medical services, graduates of
accredited schools of allopathic and osteopathic medicine,
the only people eligible for full medical licensure in the
United States, have made assurance that the profession will
regulate itself consistent with the public interest. The sur-
geon whose poor and predatory practices were winked at or
who was permitted to slide through the cracks for 20 years,
and the statistical certainty of others much like him, makes
it clear that the medical profession has been insufficiently
successful in honoring this contract.
State medical boards are the only legally authorized
organizations for stopping bad doctors from continuing to
practice medicine. In fact, the number of physicians disci-
plined by medical boards is a fraction of one percent of
those licensed to practice.6,7 The magnitude of the prob-
lem faced by state medical boards is much greater. About
115,000 physicians are licensed in the State of California.
The California Medical Board receives 10,000 complaints
against its physicians each year.7 Of these, it investigates
2,000 and prosecutes 500, resulting in about 250 annual
disciplinary actions. Only about one fifth of those disci-
plined have their licenses revoked, as our surgeon eventu-
ally did.
State medical boards, composed mostly of physicians,
primarily serve to monitor qualifications for granting priv-
ileges and generally perform well in that capacity. In their
disciplinary roles, however, they actually focus and act uponphysician substance abuse, improper prescriptions, and sex
with patients far more than upon demonstrable malprac-
tice. These charges are much less defensible, and require no
specific medical specialty expertise.
Almost no state boards have physician representatives
from every one of the 24 practice groups comprising the
American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), and they
are therefore severely limited in the level of expertise they
can bring to bear in overseeing the quality of care within
their jurisdictions. With invariably small apportionments
from their states’ budgets, the boards have neither the
manpower nor the mandates to systematically protect the
public against incompetent or ill-intentioned practitioners.
For all the money and quality assurance hoopla associ-
ated with hospital-based specialty-specific peer review, it
really has minimal effect on the ability of careless or inca-
pable doctors to practice bad medicine. Good social skills
among colleagues will usually be enough to get an errant
practitioner out of a jam at his hospital, particularly because
no institution really wants to go through the ordeal of
removing a professional staff member anyway.
Most physicians have witnessed the abundant benefit
of liberally bestowed doubt go to the subjects of internal
investigations. Not too long ago, one of us sat among the
dissenting membership of a hospital committee review-
ing the records of a surgeon who had three consecutive
cases of transplanted kidneys donated by living relatives
fail acutely, an occurrence many thousands of times in
excess of chance. The investigating committee dismissed
an independent expert’s highly critical review because
the consultant was deemed unnecessarily harsh. The
transplant surgeon was not censured. Fewer than 4% of
the complaints made to state medical boards are the
result of hospital peer review.7
The societal goals of malpractice litigation are compen-
sation of those wrongfully injured, identification and disci-
pline of bad doctors, and consequent improvements in the
quality of medical care within a community. The malprac-
tice tort process does little to accomplish any of these
goals.5 In a study of correlations between negligent injuries
and malpractice claims, Localio concluded that, “Medical-
malpractice litigation infrequently compensates patients in-
jured by medical negligence and rarely identifies and holds
providers accountable for substandard care”.8 Within this
extraordinarily large study population, only 1.5% of pa-
tients who sustained negligent injuries brought suit, and in
86% of the cases that were filed there was no medical fault.
Studdert’s group studied 14,700 medical records confirm-
ing these findings and reported that 77% of malpractice
actions filed were evaluated as unrelated to actual medical
malpractice.9
The association between negligent injury and a court’s
finding for the plaintiff was no better correlated.10 Awards
to the plaintiff were granted in 46% of cases in which
injuries were not caused by medical negligence, a rate not
significantly different from the 45% of patients who did not
receive awards after actually being harmed by malpractice.
Awards were granted in 42% of cases with no serious injury.
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attorneys considered 62% defensible, but 21% of plaintiffs
in this subgroup still received payments.11 Furthermore, in
jury trials, no relation was found between severity of injury
and the awards. A comprehensive epidemiologic evaluation
of the malpractice problem concluded that “substantial
improvements in negligent care will not lead to a large
reduction in claims rates.”12
Specialty boards are responsible for determining the
adequacy of candidates’ qualifications for certification as
specialists. Most first-time candidates for certification by
the 24 member boards that ABMS coordinates are rela-
tively young, recent graduates of approved residencies or
fellowships who are just beginning their careers as indepen-
dent practitioners. Inmany specialties, veteran practitioners
must now seek re-certification periodically throughout
their careers.
The Board’s stated mission is “to provide assurance
to the public that a physician specialist certified by a
Member Board of the ABMS has successfully completed
an approved educational program and evaluation pro-
cess, which includes an examination designed to assess
the knowledge, skills, and experience required to provide
quality patient care in that specialty.” Widely believed to
be predictive of a diplomate’s competence in the spe-
cialty, medical board certification has been associated
with reduced risk for subsequent sanction by a state
medical board.6,7 Paradoxically, indicators of superior
medical knowledge such as specialty board certification,
election to medical honor societies, and high profes-
sional prestige have been associated with a higher inci-
dence of malpractice lawsuits.13,14
The antinomy of the previous two statements has several
possible explanations, primarily because the two subgroups
are not identical. Those who do not obtain medical board
certification compose a small proportion of practitioners who
are not certificated because of lack of credentials, a deficiency
likely to show up in their overall practice. Only the most
flagrant offenders with repeated violations are punished by
Medical Boards; better qualified practitioners are better able
to avoid the multiple offenses that lead to disciplinary actions.
Superior practitionersmay have a higher incidence ofmalprac-
tice suits because they are typically referred the most complex
cases with the highest risk for failure.
Specialty medical boards do not represent themselves as
guarantors that the knowledge and experience level they
are certifying will screen for bad doctors. The process of
certification renewal for seasoned practitioners is typically
limited to validation of adequate case experience and suc-
cessful re-examination of a knowledge base. Application for
re-certification is not treated as an occasion for career
evaluation by peers. The suspicion that multiple failures to
pass specialty board examinations, as our surgeon experi-
enced, predicts poorer quality practice is intuitively inescap-
able, but unproven, chiefly because it has not been studied.
The mission statements of the leading professional
medical organizations implicitly commit them to protect-
ing the public from substandard physicians. The AmericanMedical Association promises that, “The AMA’s envi-
sioned future is to be an essential part of the professional life
of every physician and an essential force for progress in
improving the nation’s health.” The American College of
Surgeons assures us that it is “dedicated to improving the
care of the surgical patient and to safeguarding standards of
care in an optimal and ethical practice environment.” Both
statements confirm that improving patient care is the orga-
nizations’ paramount goal.
No representatives of organized medicine are better
qualified to identify bad doctors and make authoritative
corrective recommendations to state medical boards than
the professional specialty societies. Certainly, no organized
element of the medical profession has made a bolder public
avowal of its intention to globally improve patient care.
Nevertheless, the sage physician-ethicist Edmund Pelle-
grino has been deeply critical of our learned societies’
failures to thus far do very much about these pledges:
Physicians must now choose more definitively than ever
whether their professional associations will assert the pri-
macy of ethical commitment or shed any pretense of
being moral enterprises and, instead, allow economic
considerations to dominate their policies. The time is
propitious for the medical profession to act responsibly to
reaffirm the ethical commitment that grounds physicians’
authenticity. Only then can physicians justify the claim to
the moral integrity that patients expect. The present
dilemma provides an opportunity for professional medical
associations to shift the balance from self-interest to the
interests of patients, thereby regaining public support and
influence. Judging from recent trends, it is an opportunity
that may not come again.15
So the correct response to ourmultiple-choice question
is A, B, C, D, and E, “all of the above.” Every one of the
groups and processes cited has somehow assured the public
that it will pursue quality in clinical medicine, sought and
gained the public’s confidence that it is doing so, and has
thereby established its own ethical responsibility for insur-
ing that bad practitioners cannot flourish. Each has had
some success, but all have at least partly failed, and each can
do much better.
As a matter of practical application, the leading profes-
sional specialty associations should lead by maintaining and
strengthening medicine as a public trust. They can do this
by following Dr Pellegrino’s advice and adopting a proac-
tive, rather than a merely rhetorical stance in the systematic
improvement of medical care. They can do a great deal by
directing some of their considerable expertise to the eradi-
cation of chronic medical malpractice. By appointing and
offering the services of committees in each of the 24 med-
ical specialties to each of the 50 state boards of medical
examiners, the professional societies can arm the boards
with the specialized knowledge andmanpower they need to
properly investigate and fairly judge physicians suspected of
habitual poor practice.
The state boards must agree to accept the assistance of
the professional societies. They will make the necessary
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by the societies to provide themwith authoritative opinions
in allegations of persistent poor practice. The consulting
committees will give the records their confidential expert
study and submit their recommendations to the boards for
such legal redress as might be indicated.
The professional specialty societies lack the legal au-
thority to take corrective action when chronicmalpractice is
discovered. The state medical boards lack the manpower
and the specialized expertise to fairly and completely inves-
tigate each such allegation. Working together, the profes-
sional associations and the state boards can compensate for
one another’s disadvantages and fulfill their mutual goals of
protecting the public by insuring the integrity of the med-
ical profession.
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